This paper evaluates a series of programs, run by a company called OPOWER, to send Home Energy Report letters to residential utility customers comparing their energy use to that of their neighbors. Using data from randomized natural …eld experiments at 600,000 treatment and control households across the United States, I estimate that the programs reduce energy consumption by 1.1 to 2.8 percent relative to baseline. The program provides additional evidence that non-price interventions can substantially and cost e¤ectively change consumer behavior: the e¤ect is equivalent to that of a short-run electricity price increase of 17 to 28 percent, and the cost e¤ectiveness compares favorably to that of traditional energy conservation programs. I show that there is substantial treatment e¤ect heterogeneity and implement an optimal variable selection algorithm to illustrate how "pro…ling," or using a statistical decision rule to target the program at households with higher expected Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects, could further improve cost e¤ectiveness by 43 percent.
Introduction
Climate change has emerged as one of the most important public policy issues of the early 21st century, and many view energy e¢ ciency as an appealing approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Traditionally, economists and policymakers have focused on relative prices as the primary driver of adoption of energy e¢ cient technologies and behaviors. As a result, carbon cap-and-trade programs are the centerpiece of proposed climate change policies, and subsidies for energy e¢ cient capital goods draw the vast majority of federal and state energy e¢ ciency funding in the U.S. (Gillingham et al. 2006) .
Perhaps spurred by an increasing general interest in behavioral economics, there has been a recent surge of interest in "nudges" that induce energy conservation. As popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2009), a "nudge" is an intervention that changes behavior in a way that increases private or social welfare without changing prices or choice sets. Nudges are typically inexpensive relative to subsidies, and as demonstrated by Bertrand et al. (2010) in the context of consumer …nance, carefully-crafted psychological cues can have e¤ects on demand that are comparable to large changes in relative prices. 1 A critical challenge, however, is to craft interventions that are powerful and cost-e¤ective when implemented at large scale. States. With nearly 600,000 households in treatment and control groups, this is one of the largest randomized …eld experiments in history.
The …rst parts of the paper are a program evaluation of all of OPOWER's programs to date.
I …nd that the point estimates of the Average Treatment E¤ects (ATEs) of OPOWER's …rst 17 experiments range from 1.11 to 2.78 percent. Because of the large sample sizes, these are estimated with great con…dence: the standard errors in the larger programs are as small as one-tenth of the treatment e¤ect, and the coe¢ cient estimates are relatively insensitive to alternative speci…cations of …xed e¤ects and weather and time control variables. E¤ects are stronger in higher-usage summer and winter months and for more more frequent mailings, and they appear to increase for several months at the beginning of a program before stabilizing. There is no evidence that the ATEs diminish as treatment is continued over time.
For "mature" programs that have been running for more than six months, cost e¤ectiveness ranges from 1.58 to 5.55 cents of program cost per kilowatt-hour saved, with an unweighted mean of 3.55. As I will discuss, this compares favorably to the estimates for traditional energy e¢ ciency programs. This outcome is in some sense quite remarkable: a low-cost intervention -simply sending a letter -can signi…cantly and cost-e¤ectively a¤ect consumer behavior. As I will discuss, however, the welfare e¤ects are ambiguous: the costs that households incur to reduce energy use are unobserved, as is the change in welfare from learning that one compares favorably or poorly to neighbors.
The remainder of the paper builds on the insight that theory predicts that the treatment's e¤ects should be heterogeneous. In particular, many models predict that the "descriptive norm" element of the Home Energy Report treatment, in which a household's energy use is compared to that of its neighbors, would cause households that previously used less than the norm to increase usage, while causing previously high users to use less. Consistent with theory, I …nd substantial heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects, primarily as a function of pre-treatment electricity usage. The existence of heterogeneous treatment e¤ects implies that "pro…ling," or targeting future treatment toward units with highest Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects, could raise the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT) and thus improve the program's cost e¤ectiveness. Unlike some job training, health, or education programs where it may be impractical to enforce treatment assignment, treatments delivered through phone or mail can often be easily targeted. Combining these two insights implies that OPOWER is a natural and promising setting for pro…ling. The paper's …nal section develops a statistical treatment rule under which a decisionmaker who wishes to maximize the expected ATT while treating a given share of the population allocates treatment conditional on a set of observed household characteristics. This builds on a literature that shows how heterogeneous treatment e¤ects can be exploited in future programs using statistical decision rules, including Berger, Black, and Smith (2000), Dehejia (2005) I show that if the OPOWER program were to be administered to half of the eligible population, pro…ling would increase the ATE by 74 percent relative to arbitrary assignment, thereby reducing the cost per kilowatt-hour conserved by 43 percent. Aside from improving cost e¤ectiveness in locations where it is already relatively good, this would allow OPOWER to be introduced in locations where the Population Average Treatment E¤ect, or even the e¤ects for a majority of households, would be small. This qualitative result is similar to that of Dehejia (2005) , who shows that a social program that would not be implemented based on examining the ATE alone would increase welfare if implemented in subgroups that have higher Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects.
OPOWER's intervention was directly motivated by two papers by Robert Cialdini, Noah Goldstein, Vladas Griskevicius, Jessica Nolan, and Wesley Schultz. 2 Nolan et al. (2008) left doorhangers at 271 homes in San Marcos, California with di¤erent randomly assigned energy conservation messages. Doorhangers that compared a household's energy use to that of its neighbors reduced energy demand by 10 percent more than doorhangers that gave only energy conservation tips. Interestingly, while this social comparison message had the strongest e¤ects, it was "underdetected": it was the message that the experimental households themselves had predicted would be least powerful.
A second paper by Schultz et al. (2007) left doorhangers at 286 homes in the same city and showed that presenting only descriptive social norms regarding energy usage caused the group with relatively low pre-treatment usage to use more energy, an example of what psychologists call the "boomerang e¤ect" (Ringold 2002 ). This increase was eliminated in another treatment condition, however, by drawing "smiley faces" on the doorhangers given to these low users. As I will detail, the ATEs that one would have predicted for OPOWER's program based on these two foundational papers are substantially di¤erent from the true ATEs that I estimate. This means that "operational" changes required to take an initial idea to commercial scale signi…cantly change the e¤ect sizes and economic implications, which underscores part of the additional value of the present analysis. 3 The paper proceeds by …rst giving more detail on the treatment and potential pathways of e¤ects. The rest of Section 2 then provides background and descriptive statistics on OPOWER's experiments. Section 3 details the average treatment e¤ects, from the econometric strategy to the parameter estimates and resulting cost e¤ectiveness. Section 4 discusses heterogeneous treatment e¤ects. Section 5 details the statistical treatment rule and gains from pro…ling, and Section 6 concludes. 2 There is also a long psychology literature on information "feedback," and energy demand, as reviewed in Abrahamse et al. Shippee (1980) , and Stern (1992) . Giving consumers feedback on their consumption, providing information on energy savings opportunities, comparing their use to their neighbors' use, facilitating public or private goal setting, and structuring commitment devices have caused households to reduce energy consumption by 5-20 percent. Unlike the present paper, many of these analyses examined quite small samples or atypical populations. 3 There are also several other working papers that analyze aspects of OPOWER's programs in di¤erent locations. A consultancy called Summit Blue has evaluated OPOWER's project in Sacramento, California (Violette, Provencher, and Klos 2009), which has the highest Average Treatment E¤ect of the OPOWER projects. A working paper by Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2009) evaluates OPOWER's programs in Sacramento and Puget Sound, and I therefore refrain from discussing those programs and refer readers to that paper for additional information. An earlier version of this paper (Allcott 2009 ) focused speci…cally on OPOWER's program with Connexus Energy. A new working paper by Costa and Kahn (2010) shows that OPOWER's CATEs in Sacramento are stronger for liberal voters than for conservatives.
Experiment Overview

The Treatment and the Mechanisms of E¤ects
The Home Energy Reports are several-page letters with two key components. The …rst, which is illustrated in Figure 1 Kallgren (1990) call "injunctive norms," which convey that energy conservation is pro-social. The injunctive norm categorizes households as "Great" if they use less than the 20th percentile, "Below Average" if they use more than the median, and "Good" if they are in between. The injunctive categorizations, as well as the "smiley face" emoticons for "Great" and "Good" households, were included to encourage households that already used less than the median to continue their "Good" or "Great" performance, instead of conforming to the descriptive norm by increasing energy use (Schultz et al. 2007 ).
The Report's second key component is the Action Steps Module. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the energy conservation tips include both changes to the household's stock of energy-using durable goods and to the use of that capital stock. These suggestions are targeted to di¤erent households based on historical energy use patterns and demographic characteristics. For example, households whose energy use was relatively high the previous summer were more likely to receive suggestions to purchase new energy e¢ cient air conditioners.
Although it does not prove terribly useful in this paper to formalize a mathematical model of household energy demand, having such a model in mind is useful in conceptualizing the mechanisms of OPOWER's e¤ects. Imagine a household services model in the mold of Becker (1965) , where the household derives utility from "energy services," such as warmth and television, and a composite good. As in Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Davis (2008) , the household invests in "energy e¢ ciency" (the rate of transformation of energy input into energy services, which can be increased at some cost) and then sets input demand conditional on energy e¢ ciency. As in Levitt and List (2007) and Andreoni (1989) , households may receive "warm glow" utility from conserving energy, as this contributes to the public good of reduced greenhouse gas emissions. It seems likely that untreated households believe that they are closer to the social norm than they actually are, meaning that the treatment causes low (high) usage households to update beliefs about the social norm upward (downward).
Perhaps at the expense of other pathways, consider four primary mechanisms through which the treatment acts. First, the Action Steps tips provide information that allows the household to increase energy e¢ ciency at lower cost. Second, the injunctive social norms or other elements of the treatment may increase the moral cost of energy use, or equivalently, may increase the marginal "warm glow" from reducing energy demand. Third, households may "conditionally cooperate," by increasing their contribution to the public good after being informed that others are contributing more than previously believed, as in Alpizar There could be substantial heterogeneity in e¤ects through these channels. Households may have varying tastes for energy services and di¤erent initial costs of increasing energy e¢ ciency, suggesting that the treatment e¤ect could be correlated with characteristics both of the residents and of the housing stock. It is through the conditional cooperation and social learning pathways that descriptive social norms could increase energy use for households with relatively low pre-treatment usage, so one might also expect heterogeneous treatment e¤ects as a function of pre-treatment usage.
Experimental Design
As of the beginning of 2010, OPOWER had begun Home Energy Report projects at twelve di¤erent electric utilities. There are six West Coast utilities in California and Washington, six midwestern utilities, one utility in the urban Northeast, and one in a suburban area in a Mountain state. These utilites typically contract with OPOWER either because they are non-pro…t municipal utilities whose goals include energy conservation or because they are investor-owned utilities subject to energy conservation regulations. For example, under Minnosota's New Generation Energy Act of 2007, utilities in that state are required to run conservation programs that reduce energy demand by 1.5 percent each year. For business reasons, OPOWER has asked that other than Connexus Energy in Minnesota, the experimental results not be associated with the names of each utility partner. The experiments will be referred to by number; Connexus is Experiment 4.
The eligible experimental populations at each utility included residential customers with su¢ -cient electricity bill history to construct historical neighbor comparisons. 5 OPOWER randomized 4 Notice that although "nudges" are sometimes modeled as only a¤ecting non-rational agents, this need not be the case; Thaler and Sunstein (2009) include examples of nudges that a¤ect rational agents. In the OPOWER example, two of the four e¤ect pathways that I highlight act through imperfect information in a rational model, and two of the four channels are based on altruism. 5 There were several other technical restrictions on the experimental population. Households had to have valid names and addresses, no negative electricity meter reads, at least one meter read in the last three months, no signi…cant gaps in usage history, exactly one account per customer per location, and a su¢ cient number of neighbors. A handful of utility sta¤ and "VIPs" were automatically enrolled in the reports and are therefore excluded from the analysis. Households on special medical rate plans were also excluded. These additional exclusions eliminate only the experimental population into a Treatment group, which would be mailed Home Energy Reports, and a Control group, which would not. Three utilities did not include Control groups. While these data will be used for part of a regression discontinuity analysis discussed in Appendix I, they will not be used to estimate Average Treatment E¤ects of the Home Energy Reports.
Reports are sent to the Treatment group monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly, depending on the utility. In some of the more recent projects, letters are sent each month for the …rst several months of the program, with a lower frequency after that. In …ve experiments, the populations were divided into sub-populations with higher and lower baseline usage, with the Treatment groups in the high-usage subpopulation receiving more frequent Reports. As a result, there were 17 separate experimental populations randomized into treatment and control across the 12 utilities.
In Connexus and in Experiment 11, the population was randomized into monthly vs. quarterly frequency, and in Experiment 3, population was randomized between bimonthly and quarterly frequencies. Table 1 gives an overview of the start date and size of experiment for each project.
In total, I observe more than 17 million utility bills at nearly 600 thousand households across the United States.
Most utilities send a worker to read each customer's electricity bill each month 6 . Within several days of the meter read, the results are sent electronically to OPOWER, where each household's social comparison is computed. The Home Energy Report is printed by an outside contractor and sent via U.S. Mail. Any meter reads more than 30 days after the day on which OPOWER generated the …rst report are considered "post-treatment." This is typically the second meter read after the one upon the …rst Report was based. lightbulb used …ve hours each day consumes 0.3 kilowatt-hours. A typical window air conditioner running at its highest setting for …ve hours uses 5 kilowatt-hours. As illustrated in Figure 3 , heating and cooling are the primary uses of household electricity in the United States: over half of annual electricity consumption is for refrigerators, air conditioners, and space and water heating.
Data and Baseline Characteristics
In the most recent available data, computers, televisions, and lighting combined account for only 15 percent of electricity use (US Energy Information Administration 2001). a small portion of the potential population. None of the exclusions make the results less externally valid, as future programs will also be carried out in similarly restricted populations. 6 The mechanics of the meter reading process actually vary somewhat by utility. The utility in Experiment 11 has automated metering infrastructure that records energy use daily. The utilities in Experiments 15 and 7 send workers to read each household's electricity meter once every two months, and 81 percent of, billing period lengths are between 57 and 65 days. All other program utilities read meters monthly, with 93 percent of billing period lengths between 28 and 34 days. A small percentage of bills are based on estimated meter reads, but the empirical analysis considers actual meter reads only.
Baseline usage is well-balanced between treatment and control, except in Experiments 2, 6, and 8, where t-tests reject equality of the average baseline usage in Treatment and Control. These imbalances are di¢ cult to explain, and OPOWER has now begun to con…rm covariate balance before …nalizing the randomization. As the empirical speci…cations will use household …xed e¤ects, any imbalance in usage does not generate any mechanical bias. Readers concerned about these imbalances, however, may discount the results from these three experiments.
Aside from the monthly electricity meter readings for each household, I also observe OPOWER's social comparison information for every report at every household, including whether they were rated as "Below Average," "Good," or "Great," and how far they were from the cuto¤s to be in each of the other categories. I observe both the social comparisons that the Treatment group did receive and what the Control group would have received. Weather data from the National Climatic Data Center are used to construct the average Heating Degree-Days and Cooling Degree-Days over the days in each billing period, which are associated with the amount of electricity that should be required to keep a house at a comfortable temperature. 7 In several places where it will be useful to focus in on one project, the paper will examine the Connexus Energy pilot. Connexus serves approximately 110,000 customers in seven counties in central Minnesota near Minneapolis and St. Paul, of whom 78,273 were eligible to be in the experimental population. I focus on this experiment primarily because monthly and quarterly treatment frequencies were randomly assigned instead of assigned based on pre-treatment usage, as was the case in most other programs. This means that the causal e¤ects of di¤erent treatment frequencies can be estimated and also that the comparison of Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects as a function of baseline usage will be unconfounded by di¤erences in treatment frequency.
OPOWER acquires demographic data for each customer from utility surveys, public records, and a private-sector marketing data provider. For Connexus speci…cally, we observe characteristics of the house (Age, an indicator for Gas Heat, Value, an indicator for Rental, Single Family, and Square Footage) and of the occupants (Age of household head, Household Size, and Income). These characteristics will be used only for the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects estimation and pro…ling procedure. If a household had a missing demographic covariate, it was imputed based on the household's other observed covariates using conditional mean imputation. Table 3 shows baseline characteristics for the Connexus experiment.
For Connexus households ever in the "Great," "Good," or "Below Average" groups, average Baseline Usage is 16.5, 25.0, and 40.7 kilowatt-hours per day, respectively. As shown in Table 3 , the "Great" group, which by de…nition used less energy than its neighbors in similar house sizes, is also poorer, has fewer household members, and has houses that are worth less. These di¤erences 7 More precisely, average Cooling Degree-Days is the mean, over all of the days in the billing period, of the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between the day's average temperature and 65 degrees. A day with average temperature 95 has 30 CDDs, while a day with average temperature 60 has zero CDDs. Average Heating Degree-Days is the mean, over all the days in the billing period, of the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between 65 degrees and the day's average temperature. A day with average temperature 95 has zero HDDs, while a day with average temperature 60 has …ve HDDs.
are consistent with unobservable di¤erences in the marginal cost of increasing energy e¢ ciency across di¤erent households, so the e¤ects of the injunctive categorizations could not be consistently estimated simply by estimating the CATEs for households in each category.
The third column of Table 3 shows that the Treatment and Control groups are strikingly wellbalanced in the Connexus experiment. One of the ten baseline characteristics, the age of the head of household, is statistically di¤erent with 90% con…dence; the Treatment and Control averages di¤er by less than 0.2 years. As would be expected in a randomized experiment, an F test fails to reject that the two groups are identical on observables.
Attrition
The programs experience two forms of attrition, moving and opting out. Table 2 lists the cumulative probability of moving for a household over the life of each experiment, which ranges from close to zero in Experiment 8 to 13.5 percent in Experiment 13. Households that close accounts are di¤erent: they are younger, use less electricity, live in smaller, older homes, have lower incomes, and are more likely to rent and live in multifamily buildings. As with baseline usage, the probability of moving is not balanced between Treatment and Control groups in Experiments 6 and 8. In all other experiments, however, t-tests fail to reject that the probability is equal in Treatment and Control. for household i's electricity use at time t if the household were treated and were not treated, respectively (Rubin 1974) . As some households opted out, the "Treatment" here is de…ned as "being mailed the Home Energy Reports or actively opting out." 8 The primary speci…cation is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator that models energy use conditional on Treatment group indicator T i , post-treatment indicator P it , month-by-year dummy variables my and household …xed e¤ects i :
This is estimated in OLS using the standard …xed e¤ects estimator, using Huber-White ("robust") standard errors, clustered by household. As discussed by Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004), these standard errors are consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern in the errors " it within household over time.
ATE Results
Focus …rst on the ATEs for the Connexus program. Table 4 The speci…cation in column IV controls for these weather di¤erences using degree-day bins, and the coe¢ cient on the Post interaction becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. 8 Alternatively, the Treatment could have instead been de…ned as "being mailed the Home Energy Reports," in which case my estimand would be interpreted as an Intent-to-Treat e¤ect. The "Treatment" is also not "opening the Home Energy Report." Although it is quite likely that many Treatment group households do not open the Reports, and thus that the e¤ect of the "Treatment" thus de…ned would be higher, it is di¢ cult to measure letter open rates, and thus not possible to estimate this e¤ect.
The appeal of the de…nitions used here is that they generate a useful estimand from a policy perspective. OPOWER, and the utilities that contract with them and policymakers that regulate them, want to know the aggregate electricity conservation possible from applying the program to an eligible population. For the eligible population from which the experimental households were drawn, this quantity of interest can be derived simply by multiplying my ATE by the population size. Table 5 presents the ATEs across all experiments, using the primary speci…cation detailed above. The ATEs range from 1.11 percent in the monthly treatment arm of Experiment 12 to 2.78 percent in Experiment 16. Much of the heterogeneity across cities is due to di¤erences in Report frequency, time since program inception, baseline electricity use, and other observable factors, and this heterogeneity will play a key role in the following sections.
What actual activities underlie these changes in energy use? In one of their pilot programs, OPOWER has collected surveys in which Treatment group households were asked to self report what they had changed as a result of receiving the Home Energy Reports. Some of the reported e¤ects were changes to household capital stock, including weather-stripping windows, improving insulation, or servicing the air conditioner. Many of the most frequently reported changes, however, were day-to-day usage behaviors: turning o¤ lights, unplugging electronics, adjusting thermostats, and closing window blinds. Interestingly, these are behaviors that most consumers likely already knew could save them energy. This suggests that at least some of the letters'e¤ects act through drawing attention or increasing the "moral cost" of energy use, instead of solely by providing new information or inducing changes in capital stock.
How do the percent ATEs translate into these real-world behaviors? Taking the simple average across "mature" programs that have been running for more than six months gives gives an ATE of 1.74 percent, or 0.57 kilowatt-hours per day. An air conditioner running at full power uses about one kilowatt of power, so this treatment e¤ect is equivalent to turning o¤ an air conditioner that would have been on for 34 minutes each day. A standard incandescent lightbulb uses 60 watts, so the treatment e¤ect is also equivalent to 9.5 hours of lightbulb use per day. Recall that many "treated" households likely do not open, understand, or act on the letters, meaning that the e¤ects on those who do must be much larger. These e¤ects seem remarkably large, given that the treatment is as simple as sending a letter.
Another useful way to frame the e¤ects of a non-price intervention is to calculate the price change that would produce similar e¤ects. Given that treatment e¤ects are visible very soon after the letters are received and the e¤ects stabilize after several months, short run price changes are an appropriate comparison. Using the event study in Reiss and White (2008) , the "60-day elasticity" of residential electricity demand in California with respect to a large, unanticipated price changes is -0.10. From Davis (2008) , the short-run elasticity of electricity demand for clothes washers in Kansas is -.06. These elasticities imply that the e¤ects of OPOWER's average existing program are equivalent to short run electricity price increases of 17 to 29 percent. This again is remarkable: a simple non-price treatment changes consumer behavior as much as substantial price increases.
From a policy perspective, one might also be interested in comparing these e¤ects to those of sustained increases in electricity prices that might result from climate change policies that would regulate carbon dioxide emissions. Reiss and White (2005) How important is the experimental control group to consistently-estimated ATEs? This is very important to document for practitioners, because nearly all energy e¢ ciency programs are still evaluated using non-experimental data. With Treatment group data only, the approach would be to use a di¤erence estimator to compare energy demand before and after treatment. Perhaps the most promising approach would be to include household …xed e¤ects and 12 month-of-year dummies and control for di¤erences in weather using parametric functions of Heating Degree-Days and Cooling Degree-Days.
Again using the Connexus project as an example, Figure 4 shows the results of estimating the Monthly group ATE with data cumulative through each month of the post-treatment period. The red diamonds and error bars show the true results using the experiment's Treatment and Control groups; the rightmost diamond corresponds to the monthly ATE in speci…cation II of Table 4 .
The black double line shows non-experimental estimates using the one-degree bins; the right-most data point corresponds to the ATE in column 2 of Table III . The blue single line shows nonexperimental estimates using the fourth-order polynomial HDD and CDD controls. Linear HDD and CDD controls give ATE estimates comparable to the polynomial controls.
As the graph illustrates, both non-experimental speci…cations signi…cantly overstate the ATE when using data through the early post-treatment period and signi…cantly understate the ATE after data are added from the summer and fall of 2009. Across the 13 months of estimates with the two speci…cations, 23 of the 26 non-experimental estimates are statistically di¤erent from the experimental estimates with 95% con…dence. This shows that a non-experimental evaluation would require more than the two years of pre-treatment data and one-plus year of post-treatment data available here. It further suggests that even estimates with more data could be sensitive to reasonableseeming alternative formulations of weather controls. Related to the discussion of Lalonde (1986) and Dehejia and Wahba (1999) , comparing the experimental and non-experimental results suggests that observable time and weather covariates are helpful, but not su¢ cient, in this setting in controlling for e¤ects on the outcome variable from factors that are correlated with treatment.
How do these results compare to the two papers that laid the foundations for OPOWER? It turns out that extrapolating from these small-scale pilots would not have provided much insight into the treatment e¤ects or cost e¤ectiveness of OPOWER's programs. In Schultz et al. (2007) the ATE for a treatment most similar to OPOWER -treating both low and high users with both injunctive and descriptive norms -was 5.0 percent after one month. This was not statistically di¤erent than zero, and the 90 percent con…dence interval also included 10 percent. In Nolan et al. (2008) , the treatment most similar to OPOWER -the social comparison treatment relative to the information control -had 10.1 percent and 7.3 percent e¤ects after one and two months, respectively. After two months, this was not statistically di¤erent than zero, and the 90 percent con…dence interval included 20 percent.
If one were to take the point estimates literally, what's remarkable is that seemingly-minor operational issues, such as whether the treatment is delivered as a letter or a doorhanger, whether the smiley faces are printed or written by hand, and whether it's implemented in San Diego or elsewhere in California, substantially in ‡uence e¤ect sizes. Given the relatively small samples, the con…dence intervals include wide ranges of treatment e¤ects that could have made the programs either exceedingly cost e¤ective or massively wasteful relative to alternative energy conservation programs.
Further discussion is outside the scope of the present paper, but Allcott and Mullainathan (2010b) use the OPOWER treatments as an example in a broader analysis of external validity in empirical microeconomics.
Cost E¤ectiveness
Cost e¤ectiveness is de…ned here as cents of cost to the program administrator per kilowatt-hour of electricity conserved. The annualized numerator is estimated by multiplying an approximate cost per Report by the annualized number of Reports delivered during the program to date. Because households that requested to opt out of treatment are included as treated, but money is not spent to send them Reports, the cost estimate is adjusted by the annualized percent opt-out rate. The drops by nearly half relative to monthly Reports, while the ATE drops by less than that. This is despite the fact that most experiments, households with lowest baseline usage, and thus lowest Conditional Average Treatment E¤ects, were assigned to receive Reports quarterly.
Based on the point estimates, the most cost e¤ective program is Experiment 8, at 1.58 cents per kilowatt-hour. This experiment has bimonthly frequency, which reduces annualized cost substantially relative to monthly. The point estimate of the ATE is the second highest of all programs, however, regardless of frequency. This may be because the experimental population is in a rural midwest location where the population appears to have been relatively responsive to treatment, although the experimental population is relatively small and the standard error is therefore wider.
The least attractive cost e¤ectiveness numbers are for Experiments 6 and 9. Each of these programs has recently started, meaning that the ATEs will likely increase somewhat as the program matures, and each is initially sending Reports each month, which increases the annualized cost.
It is therefore likely that these cost e¤ectiveness numbers will improve as the experiments mature and as they shift to less frequent mailings. The worst cost e¤ectiveness of a mature project is for quarterly treatment for Experiment 13. This is because the subpopulation drawn for quarterly frequency has relatively low electricity usage to begin with and because the experiment is in a location where many households are only part-time residents. Energy e¢ ciency programs are in practice often compared in this way, based on cost to the electric utility, and this calculation is therefore useful for comparison with existing work. This would be, however, a highly incomplete accounting of the welfare e¤ects, both for energy conservation programs in general and for the OPOWER program in particular. For example, we do not observe the costs consumers incur to increase the energy e¢ ciency of their household capital stock, nor do we know the cost of devoting additional time to changing energy use behavior. Furthermore, an important element of the social costs of energy use, the marginal damage of carbon dioxide emissions, is highly uncertain. In addition, it is di¢ cult to know consumers' change in "moral utility" from updating beliefs about their position relative to the social norm. Ironically, while we will momentarily see that the relatively high-usage households have the largest CATEs and thus substantially improve cost e¤ectiveness, these households could in theory be worse o¤ due to the psychic costs of learning that they are worse than the norm.
Heterogeneous Treatment E¤ects
While the empirical focus so far has been on Average Treatment E¤ects, theory predicts that treatment e¤ects could vary over time and across households. This section documents this heterogeneity, again using the Connexus project as the example, to motivate the analyses in the remainder of the paper. Figure 6 illustrates the treatment e¤ects for each month in the Connexus experiment, for both the monthly and quarterly treatments. This …gure is generated by interacting the full set of monthby-year dummies with both the monthly and quarterly treatment dummies, including the same set of month-by-year dummies as controls and using household …xed e¤ects. The …rst reports were sent in January 2009, and this is the excluded month.
The …gure shows that treatment e¤ects vary over time in several consistent ways. After treatment begins, the treatment e¤ects increase for several months before reaching something closer to a steady state. After more than a year of continuing treatment, there is no evidence of any decline in the treatment e¤ects. Notice, however, that the quarterly group's treatment e¤ects decay be- The conditional cooperation and social learning mechanisms predict a "boomerang e¤ect," that revealing the descriptive norm will cause a reduction in the dispersion of usage in the treatment group: households with high pre-treatment usage should decrease usage, while those with low pretreatment usage should increase usage. If this were the only source of treatment e¤ects, it would cause the QTEs to be positive for low quantiles, indicating an increase in usage, and negative for high quantiles. month-by-year e¤ects, and household …xed e¤ects. In general, the more electricity a household used before the treatment, the more that it conserved post-treatment. The CATEs range from almost zero for the bottom two deciles of baseline usage to 7.4 percent in the top decile.
The QTEs and ATEs conditional on baseline usage show that the boomerang e¤ect is not strong enough to induce previously-low usage households to increase consumption. This could be because this e¤ect is itself not strong in this setting, perhaps because the injunctive normative messages moderate this e¤ect, or because the informational e¤ects of the treatment outweigh the boomerang e¤ect. Regardless of the absolute level of the treatment e¤ect, however, it is clear that there is substantial heterogeneity conditional on pre-treatment usage. Table 8 , to which I will return in the next section, tests for heterogeneity as a function of other observable characteristics.
A regression discontinuity (RD) design can be used to estimate the importance of the injunctive categorizations in mitigating the potential boomerang e¤ect. The RD design exploits the fact that the categories were based on sharp cuto¤s. Households who had used just more energy than the 20th percentile of their comparison group are in the limit identical to households that use just less energy, but the former are labeled "Good" while the latter are labeled "Great." Similarly, households using just more than the mean of their comparison group were labeled "Below Average," while households using just less were labeled "Good."
The RD analysis is carried out in Appendix I. In brief, the results show that while the treatment e¤ects di¤er substantially for households in the three di¤erent categories, only a small percentage of the di¤erences are attributable to the categorization itself. No more than 24 percent of the increase in the treatment e¤ect for the group labeled "Good" relative to the group labeled "Great" is because of that label. Similarly, the di¤erential e¤ects of the categorizations cause less than 30 percent of the increase in the treatment e¤ect for the group labeled "Below Average" instead of "Good." While the injunctive norms may be e¤ective in the sense of a¤ecting all recipients equally, they do not generate substantial heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect. Instead, the di¤erences in e¤ects between low and high usage households must be driven primarily by the descriptive norms or by factors unrelated to social comparisons, such as the di¤ering e¤ects of the energy conservation information.
Pro…ling
Regardless of the mechanism that drives the variation in treatment e¤ects across households with di¤erent baseline usage, the heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects as a function of an observable characteristic suggests that there could be substantial gains from targeting the program towards the most responsive households. Furthermore, because we observe a larger set of household characteristics that may be correlated with the treatment e¤ect, a more comprehensive approach to "pro…ling" could be useful. This section builds on the pro…ling literature, and in particular on a paper by Imai and Strauss (2009), to develop an optimal statistical decision rule to allocate future treatment.
Compared to much of the recent literature, the present problem is straightforward, as the objective function will be unambiguous and the decisionmaker can be modeled as risk-neutral. I focus on perhaps the simplest case of pro…ling: the OPOWER program is to be allocated to a given proportion of the population, and we want to target the program such as obtain the largest expected treatment e¤ect 10 conditional on the information from a previous randomized trial. The decision variable is which subset of its customer population, de…ned by observable characteristics, will be assigned to treatment.
The constraint of targeting less than the entire population could arise because the electric utility has limited resources to treat its entire customer base or only wishes to treat a fraction that results in cost e¤ectiveness better than some threshold. It could also arise if an Energy E¢ ciency Resource Standard, the state regulation requiring a given amount of energy conservation relative to baseline, could be satis…ed by treating only a portion of the population with the Home Energy Reports.
The decisionmaker seeks a statistical treatment rule : X ! f0; 1g that maps individuals with characteristics X to the treated or control states for a future OPOWER program. Denote by the space of possible treatment rules. The scalar i = (X i ) 2 f0; 1g is the choice of treatment for individual i with characteristics X i . The decisionmaker has information from the existing randomized experiment in a representative sample of larger population P. Recall that, as de…ned earlier in the paper, the heterogeneous Conditional Average Treatment E¤ect (X i ) is typically less than zero, meaning that we wish to assign treatment to units with expected treatment e¤ects that are more negative.
The utility's objective is to maximize the expected (negative) Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT) conditional on the information from the past experiment, given that they are to treat H households from the population:
Imagine ordering the households in the population by expected treatment e¤ect conditional on their X i . Denote by R the Hth-strongest expected treatment e¤ect. Given the assumption of no spillovers between treatment units, the optimal statistical decision rule collapses to assigning OPOWER treatment to the H households with expected treatment e¤ects more negative than R :
While recent related applications such as Dehejia (2005) 
The technical challenge is to determine which conditioning variables will be used to estimate the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects and to assign future treatment. Including a large set of conditioning variables could allow treatment to be targeted at smaller subgroups that might have particularly large treatment e¤ects. In a …nite sample, however, including a larger set of covariates increases the likelihood of over…tting, which could cause the program to be targeted at subgroups that idiosyncratically appeared to have large treatment e¤ects only in the experimental data. To emphasize this di¤erently, one would not want to take the naive approach of pro…ling based on CATEs estimated in any and all possible subgroups. Intuitively, the problem is that this naive approach does not account for the fact that while smaller subgroups give increasingly heterogeneous CATE point estimates, which might seem to be useful for pro…ling, some mechanism is needed to account for the fact that these CATEs would be estimated with increasingly large standard errors. 
Pro…ling and Cost E¤ectiveness: Results
The Connexus program again provides the example data for the pro…ling analysis. Table 8 The bars in Figure 12 shows the Average Treatment E¤ects on the Treated as a function of the percent of the population treated, when treatment assignment is done using the optimal pro…ling rule. The line, with dotted standard errors, shows the marginal treatment e¤ects: the ATE for the next block of the population that could be added to treatment. This again makes clear the distribution of treatment e¤ects conditional on observables, which are very close to zero in for the 20 percent of households with the lowest baseline usage.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates the e¤ects of the OPOWER Home Energy Reports, which give households feedback on past energy consumption, compare them to their neighbors, and provide energy conservation tips. The program is a remarkable departure from traditional energy e¢ ciency programs in that it is a non-price "nudge" intervention designed with direct insight from behavioral science and is implemented using randomized controlled trials. The perceived success or failure of these pilot programs will directly a¤ect millions of dollars of future investment under new energy conservation regulations and climate policies and could more generally in ‡uence how future energy e¢ ciency programs will be designed and evaluated.
I …nd that the Average Treatment E¤ects of OPOWER's programs range from 1.11 to 2.78 percent of baseline usage, depending on location, program duration, frequency of Reports, and other factors. I also show that the program's e¤ects increase markedly as a function of pre-treatment consuption. This is consistent with (but not causal evidence of) a "boomerang e¤ect" in which learning the social norm can fail to motivate households with low baseline consumption or even cause them to increase consumption. A regression discontinuity analysis, however, shows that being assigned to a di¤erent injunctive norm category does not signi…cantly change the treatment e¤ect for households near the category cuto¤s. Instead, the heterogeneous e¤ects must be driven by di¤erential impacts of the descriptive norms or in the new knowledge from the energy conservation tips.
Although the OPOWER experiment was carried out in a speci…c domain and requires a generalinterest reader to digest some institutional detail, this analysis has two important and generalizable economic implications. First, the analysis adds to a recently-growing appreciation of how "pro…l- Second, this analysis adds to recently-growing appreciation of how non-price interventions can a¤ect consumer behavior. Economists in general, and energy e¢ ciency program managers in particular, have historically focused on how prices and subsidies a¤ect demand. It seems remarkable that simply sending a letter -a treatment that has no e¤ect on relative prices and may have limited e¤ects on information sets -can persistently a¤ect usage by as much as a 17 to 28 percent price increase. As climate change policies are implemented and utility regulation increasingly encourages energy conservation, non-price nudges may receive greater attention, and insights from behavioral science may be increasingly taken to scale.
Appendices
7.1 Appendix I: Regression Discontinuity
Empirical Strategy
The design of the injunctive categorizations allows the use of a Regression Discontinuity design to estimate their relative e¤ects. Recall that households who used less than the 20th percentile of their neighbor comparison group are labeled as "Great," those who use more than the mean are labeled "Below Average," and those in between are labeled "Good." A group of households just below a cuto¤ are in the limit identical to a group just above, and thus their treatment e¤ects from the descriptive norms and energy conservation tips are identical. The two groups received di¤erent injunctive categorizations, however, and any di¤erences in treatment group usage are caused by the categorization. This section implements that intuition. De…ne as t the date that corresponds to the most recent Report generated in time to a¤ect usage for meter read date t. 12 The "intuitive regression" that one might like to run would be to compare the treatment e¤ect in bill t for households described as "Good" based on that recent Report t to the treatment e¤ects for households that had been categorized as "Great" or "Below Average":
The variables 1(Below Average t ) and 1(Great t ) are indicator variables for whether the household was categorized as "Below Average" or "Great" on Report t . The coe¢ cients b G and b B could naively be interpreted as the causal e¤ects of these two categorizations relative to being categorized as "Good." Since other elements of the social comparisons and the knowledge e¤ect di¤er across households in the di¤erent normative categorizations, however, b G and b B are not consistent estimators of these causal e¤ects.
Instead of this speci…cation, I therefore use a regression discontinuity estimator that exploits the fact that the injunctive categorizations were based on categories with sharp cuto¤s. De…ne c 
For each cuto¤, the RD estimator of the e¤ect of the normative categorization RD is:
More speci…cally, t is the date of the most recent Report generated more than 24 days and less than 55 days before meter read date t. If there is no Report in that period, the date of the most recent Report generated between 21 and 24 days before meter read date t is de…ned as t . If there is no Report in that period, the most recent Report generated between 55 and 120 days before t is de…ned as t . In the sporadic cases where there has been no Report generated for a household in the past 120 days, data point it is coded as not having an injunctive categorization.
In keeping with the suggestion of graphical analysis of RD designs (Lee and Lemieux 2009, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009), Figure 9 illustrates the treatment group's consumption as a function of distance from the household-speci…c comparison group's mean consumption, which is the cuto¤ between being categorized as "Good" vs. "Below Average." The bin width, chosen based on visual inspection, is 10 kilowatt-hours per month. The Usage variable on the y-axis, which as before is normalized as a percent of Control group post-treatment usage, is residual of month-by-year controls and household …xed e¤ects. The line is upward sloping, as residual usage is serially autocorrelated: households that consume less compared to their peers on a given bill also tend to have lower residual usage on future bills. Figure 10 is the analogous illustration near the 20th percentile of the household-speci…c comparison group, which is the cuto¤ between being categorized as "Great" vs. "Good."
The …gures illustrate two key issues. First, the outcome variable Y it is very close to linear in the forcing variable D it . This means that local linear regression, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2009) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), will be a natural speci…cation. Second, there is no observable jump in the outcome at the cuto¤. This suggests that we will estimate a zero e¤ect, and the standard error -the "tightness" of that zero -will be the parameter of interest.
A separate regression is run for each cuto¤ using a rectangular kernel; Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) note that the choice of kernel rarely a¤ects results. This gives estimates of G ; the e¤ect of being "Good" instead of "Great," and B , the e¤ect of being "Below Average" instead of "Good":
The speci…cations again use household …xed e¤ects, with standard errors clustered by household. While all observations are included in order to more precisely estimate month-by-year dummies and household …xed e¤ects, each estimated is in e¤ect based only on observations with D it within bandwidth h of a cuto¤. Note also that the kernel excludes observations where D it = 0. Some households are themselves the 20th percentile of their comparison group. OPOWER does not retain the distance between Y it and the next higher-consuming household's usage, meaning that the correct distance to the category cuto¤ cannot be calculated.
Because of the large number of observations, regressions are run separately for each experiment e, and the set of estimated b e are combined using a minimum distance estimator:
The weights w e applied to the estimates from each experiment are chosen to minimize b V . It is straightforward to show that this gives:
What remains is to choose the bandwidth h. Because of the very large sample size, it would be extremely computationally intensive to carry out the traditional "leave-one-out" cross validation approach introduced in Ludwig and Miller (2005) and detailed in Imbens and Lemieux (2007) . Instead, I place each it observation within each experiment as a percentile in the experiment's distribution of D it and generate two placebo cuto¤s that are percentiles on either side of the true cuto¤ c it . The above regression is then run for each experiment, replacing 1(jD it j < h) with an indicator for whether D it is less than h below the lower placebo cuto¤ or h above the higher placebo cuto¤. This regression generates predictions b
Y it (h; ) for the set of observations S between the two placebo cuto¤s, where the …tted values for observations above (below) the true cuto¤ are …tted only with the regression line above (below) the placebo cuto¤. The cross-validation criterion is the mean of the squared prediction errors for S: Table 6 presents the regression discontinuity results around the Mean cuto¤. Results from the "intuitive regression" from equation (5) are presented in the …rst rows, with and without household …xed e¤ects. Using pooled OLS and …xed e¤ects, respectively, treatment e¤ects are 0.52 and 1.12 percentage points larger for households recently categorized as "Good" instead of "Great," the two categories on either side of the 20th percentile of the neighbor comparison group distribution. The lower half of the table presents the RD estimates of B and the values of the cross-validation criterion functions for a series of di¤erent bandwidths. As illustrated in Figure 9 , there is a linear relationship between the forcing and outcome variables for a broad range of distances from the cuto¤s. This explains why the cross-validation criterion function is very ‡at for a wide range of bandwidths: CV Y (h; = 1) changes by only 0.3 percent as the bandwidth goes from 20 to 1000 kilowatt-hours per month. The minima are at 300 for = 1 and = 5 and 150 for = 10. Table 7 displays the parallel results for the 20th percentile cuto¤. Again using the equation (5), the treatment e¤ects are 0.51 to 0.78 percentage points larger for households recently categorized as "Below Average" instead of "Good." The cross-validation criterion function are nearly as ‡at in the range of 40 to 500 kilowatt-hours per month, and the minima are at 300 for = 1 and = 5 and 200 for = 10.
Results
The key result is that the di¤erent injunctive categorizations do not cause large di¤erences in the treatment e¤ects. Using the standard errors at h = 300 for the Mean cuto¤, di¤erential e¤ects of larger than 0.13 percentage points in absolute value can be ruled out with 90 percent con…dence in a one-sided test. Dividing this by the b G from equation (5), no more than 11 to 24 percent of the larger e¤ects for households labeled "Good" instead of "Great" are due to the di¤erent injunctive categorizations.
At the 20th percentile cuto¤, di¤erential e¤ects of more than 0.15 percentage points can be ruled out using the same test and bandwidth. No more than 19 to 30 percent of the di¤erential e¤ects for households labeled "Below Average" instead of "Good" are due to the di¤erent injunctive categorizations. While the injunctive norms may have some e¤ect that is equally useful across all households, being classi…ed in one category or another compared to neighbors does not have large di¤erential e¤ects on average.
The results are robust to a number of di¤erent speci…cations. The regressions above are restricted to Treatment group households only, but looking instead for discontinuities in the treatment e¤ect around the cuto¤ increases the variance of the estimator but does not qualitatively change the results. Assuming the same slope of the forcing variable above and below the cuto¤, 1 = 2 , has no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the b , but this does not substantially reduce its standard error. As the graphical analysis suggests would be the case, however, omitting the linear terms D it 1(D it < 0) and D it 1(D it > 0) does a¤ect the estimates at all but small bandwidths. Using a 4th-order polynomial in D it does not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on b , largely because it substantially increases the standard errors. All of these additional speci…cations are omitted to conserve on space.
Appendix II: Pro…ling Variable Selection
This Appendix details the procedure for selecting a vector of observables and interactions to condition on when estimating \ i (X i ) in the pro…ling procedure. The discussion of this problem and my approach to addressing it draw heavily on previous work by Imai and Strauss (2009) and, somewhat less directly, on Gunter, Zhu, and Murphy (2007).
While there is a large literature on how to select "predictive" variables that are correlated with the outcome, there is no consensus on the choice of "prescriptive variables" that help assign units to treatment. Predictive variables are by de…nition correlated with the outcome and therefore may be useful for reducing residual variance, i.e. improving the e¢ ciency of the estimator. However, if a predictive variable has the same correlation with the outcome in treatment and control, meaning that it is not correlated with the treatment e¤ect, this variable would not be useful for generating a statistical decision rule.
Most fundamentally, a powerful prescriptive variable is one that increases the e¢ cacy of the targeted program in a future implementation when pro…ling is conditioned on that variable. Intuitively, one approach to choosing the set of prescriptive variables is to try conditioning on all possible covariates and subsets thereof, generating assignment rules based on each potential set of covariates, then running a future program based on that assignment rule and measuring the e¤ects. Because these theoretical future programs di¤er only in the rules used to assign treatment, the future program with the highest ATE is the one with the best assignment rule.
The actual approach is designed to mimic that process, while addressing two concerns. First, we of course cannot try many di¤erent future implementations. We can, however, mimic that process with the data from the existing program: we can partition the data, use the "…rst" part to generate the treatment rule and the "second" part to test its e¢ cacy. If we then reverse the partition -use the "second" part to generate the treatment rule and the "…rst part" to test e¢ cacy, we will have then exploited all of the data available while still cross-validating the assignment mechanism outside of the sample that generated it.
A second problem with the intuitive approach is that it would be very computationally intensive to try all possible sets of covariates. Instead, using a procedure developed by Imai and Strauss (2009), we can rank the individual covariates based on their "prescriptiveness." In this context, "prescriptiveness" means how much conditioning and assigning based on that one covariate increases the expected treatment e¤ect relative to random assignment of treatment.
Imagine ordering the variables from most to least prescriptive. Beginning with the most prescriptive variable, one can progressively add the next-most prescriptive variable to the set of conditioning variables. Conditioning assignment on additional covariates should for some time increase the future treatment e¤ect of the future targeted program, but the over…tting e¤ect will eventually dominate and the future treatment e¤ect will decrease. This procedure of sequentially adding variables in order of prescriptiveness ensures that we have the most prescriptive set of variables at the apparent maximum. This ordering procedure simpli…es the problem from one of selecting the optimal set of covariates to selecting the optimal number of covariates. Because of the ordering, the optimal number will also tell us the optimal set (Imai and Straus 2009).
Speci…cs of the Variable Selection Algorithm
The goal is to select the optimal set of covariates Z , drawn from some set of possible covariates Z, such that a statistical treatment rule conditioning on Z maximizes the expected treatment e¤ect in a future implementation of the program. The variables Z are functions of household observable characteristics X. Denote by Z (X) the treatment rule using variables Z, and denote by e ( Z (X)) the expected treatment e¤ect of a future program using that rule. Consistent with the maximization problem introduced above, that treatment e¤ect is conditioned on including some set of people such that the minimum treatment e¤ect is above some threshold R . For simplicity, in this part of the problem, I assume that e ( Z (X)) re ‡ects the treatment e¤ect when one-half of the population is to be treated. The maximization problem is:
Following Imai and Strauss (2009), I implement a four-step procedure.
Step 1: De…ne the possible set of prescriptive variables. In principle, the possible set of prescriptive variables Z could be all levels of interactions of the 10 observable household characteristics, plus polynomial series of the continuous variables. To speed computation, I use only the variables themselves, interactions of each pair, and squares of the continuous variables. This gives a set Z of J = 62 possible covariates, which are indexed j = 1; :::; J.
Step 2: Order the set of variables by prescriptiveness. In this step, the set of J possible covariates is ordered by "prescriptiveness": the amount by which conditioning on that one variable Z j increases the expected future treatment e¤ect e ( Zj (X)). For each of the J possible covariates Z j , the procedure is:
Step 2a: Use the entire dataset to estimate the average treatment e¤ect, combining Monthly and Quarterly treatment arms, and the amount by which the ATE changes with a change in Z j :
Step 2b: For both the Treatment and Control groups, …t each individual i's \ (X i ) = b 0 + b 1 Z ji from the above regression.
Step 2c: Treatment rule Zj (X) assigns treatment to the one-half of households with the most negative …tted treatment e¤ects.
Step 2d: Using the half of the original randomized Treatment and Control groups assigned to treatment by this potential rule, estimate the treatment e¤ect e ( Zj (X)).
After computing these expected average treatment e¤ects for each Z j , these e¤ects are ordered from the largest negative treatment e¤ect to smallest. This gives a new ordering of the set Z from most to least prescriptive, such that e ( Zj (X)) e ( Zj+1 (X)); 8j. The double solid line in Figure 11 illustrates this ordering for j = 1; :::; 62. The most prescriptive variable is Baseline Usage, followed by interactions of Baseline usage with the Single Family and Rent indicator variables.
Step 3: Determine the expected ATE for each combination of prescriptive variables.
For each combination of prescriptive variables with e¤ectiveness greater than or equal to that of j, cross validation is now used to predict the expected treatment e¤ect of pro…ling on that combiation in assigning treatment for a future program. First, the sample is randomly divided into K = 5 subsets for K-fold cross validation.
For each value of j from 1 to J, which are now ordered from most to least prescriptive, the procedure is:
Step 3a: De…ne Z 1;:::;j as the set of variables such that e ( Z l (X)) e ( Zj (X)). This set contains all the variables, including j, that have at least as prescriptive as j. For each of the K cross-validation sets, estimate the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects equation using the K 1 "training sets" excluding k. In set k, which is out of sample, then determine the treatment rule kZ1;:::;j (X).
Step 3b: After using cross validation to determine the treatment rule Z1;:::;j (X) for all Treatment and Contol observations in the data, then use the original randomization into Treatment and Control to estimate the ATE for those units that would be assigned to treatment, e ( Z1;:::;j (X)).
Step 4: Determine the optimal number of variables. The single solid line appearing on the lower portion of Figure 11 illustrates the e ( Z1;:::;j (X)) computed via cross validation when pro…ling based on an increasing number of covariates Z. The optimal set of covariates Z is determined by the point on that line with the largest (negative) treatment e¤ect:
In this case, the most negative treatment e¤ect is at the far left of Figure 11 , meaning that j = 1. In this application, the optimal statistical treatment rule assigns treatment based only on Baseline Usage. *, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% con…dence, respectively. "Number of Households" by normative categorization re ‡ects the number of treatment or control households that were at any point in that category. The sum of these numbers across the three categories therefore is greater than the number of households in the experiment. *, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% con…dence, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the household's average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized by average control group consumption in the Post period. *, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% con…dence, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the household's average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized by average control group consumption in the Post period. All speci…cations include month-byyear dummies, and all but the "Pooled OLS" row have household …xed e¤ects. h refers to the bandwidth of the RD estimator. The N column counts observations within the bandwidth. The CV Y (h; ) columns display the value of the cross-validation criterion functions at di¤erent . Equation (5) *, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% con…dence, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the household's average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized by average control group consumption in the Post period. All speci…cations include month-byyear dummies, and all but the "Pooled OLS" row have household …xed e¤ects. h refers to the bandwidth of the RD estimator. The N column counts observations within the bandwidth. The CV Y (h; ) columns display the value of the cross-validation criterion functions at di¤erent . Equation (5) *, **, ***: Di¤erent from zero with 90%, 95%, and 99% con…dence, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the household's average daily electricity consumption (kilowatt-hours), normalized by average control group consumption in the Post period. The ATE represents combination of Monthly and Quarterly groups. Speci…cation I: Optimal set of conditioning variables Z : Baseline Usage only. Speci…cation II: "Rule of thumb" conditioning variables: All observed demographic variables. Speci…cation III: "Rule of thumb" conditioning variables: Only demographic variables statistically signi…cantly associated with the treatment e¤ect. Speci…cation IV: No conditioning variables. 
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